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Although nearly all arbitration rules provide for the right 
to assert counterclaims in investor-state disputes, many 
tribunals are reluctant to allow such counterclaims. The two 
key obstacles examined by tribunals and this Article, are 
investor consent to counterclaims and determination of investor 
obligations towards the host State.  
Jurisprudence of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT), 
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) tribunals, and United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) tribunals suggests that 
if the relevant treaty contains an offer of jurisdiction only in 
relation to disputes arising out of State obligations, tribunals 
are reluctant to extend their jurisdiction over counterclaims. 
However, if the relevant dispute resolution provision is broad 
or the parties subsequently alter the jurisdictional offer either 
explicitly or implicitly, tribunals are more likely to allow 
counterclaims. 
This Article shows that in the absence of provisions setting 
out investor obligations in international treaties, general 
principles of law appear to be an appropriate source of 
international law to determine such obligations. The State may 
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also assert counterclaims if the investor breached its 
obligations under the investment contract concluded with the 
State. The State, however, cannot assert counterclaims in 
investor-state arbitration based on purely domestic law 
obligations of investors. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last few decades, States have concluded over 
2,500 bilateral investment treaties and numerous multilateral 
agreements to facilitate foreign investment.1 According to an 
almost universal consensus, foreign investments benefit host 
States by stimulating greater competition, generating an influx 
of capital, technology, and managerial skills, and creating new 
jobs.2 Foreign investors also benefit from access to new 
markets, a cheaper workforce, and natural resources.3
Nearly all investment treaties provide for arbitration to 
resolve disputes.
  
4 The system of investor-state dispute 
resolution endows private persons—either individuals or 
corporations—with the capacity to submit a claim against a 
State without the intervention of their respective national 
governments.5 Rather than forcing investors to rely either on 
domestic courts or on State-to-State political negotiations, 
international investment treaties provide investors with a right 
to initiate dispute settlements directly against the host State in 
a neutral forum.6
Under these treaties, investors can typically choose to 
submit a dispute to ICSID or to an ad hoc tribunal established 
  
 
 1. UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International Investment 
Agreements (2008-June 2009), INT’L INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS MONITOR NO. 
3, 2009, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3766&lang=1. 
 2. See, e.g., Geoffrey Garrett, The Causes of Globalization, 33 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 941, 947 (2000); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: MAXIMISING BENEFITS, MINIMISING 
COSTS 10–18 (2002); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., FDI IN 
FIGURES (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/43/48462282.pdf.  
 3. See generally Garrett, supra note 2 (analyzing changes in trade and 
foreign investment policy that has led to increased international market 
integration).  
 4. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT AND IMPACT ON INVESTMENT RULEMAKING, at 78, U.N. Sales No. 
E.07.II.D.10 (2007). 
 5. See YARASLAU KRYVOI, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 26–27 (2010). 
 6. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a 
Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 
471, 476 (2009).  
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under the rules of UNCITRAL.7  Treaties may also provide for 
dispute resolution procedures of other institutions such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, or the London Court of International 
Arbitration.8
Because investment treaties are primarily intended to 
encourage foreign investment, they are usually silent on the 




The States’ right to counterclaim seeks to counterbalance 
this asymmetry—counterclaims facilitate equality of the 
parties and, rendered in a single forum, make investor-state 
dispute resolution more efficient.
 Hardwired into the very structure of 
investment treaties therefore, is an apparent asymmetry 
between the rights of investors and the obligations of States.  
10
Counterclaims, however, remain relatively rare and 
tribunals are often reluctant to allow them. It has been 
suggested that States rarely bring counterclaims because of 
their counsels’ failure to advise them on this matter.
   
11 Indeed, 
State counterclaims present a number of particular legal 
problems: express investor consent to counterclaims or their 
obligations are absent in treaties, and the nature of the 
investor-state dispute resolution system is primarily tailored to 
protect investor interests.12
This Article suggests that such constraints should not be 
fatal to a State’s right to assert counterclaims against foreign 
investors. The right to counterclaim is a procedural right 
customary to all major arbitration rules, including those used 
  
 
 7. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of Investment. U.S.-Arg., art. VII, Nov. 19, 1991, 31 I.L.M 124 
(1992). 
 8. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of 
China and the Government of the Belize on the Protection and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, art. 7, Jan. 16, 1999.  
 9. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 7–11 (2008). 
 10. See infra pp. 220–22. 
 11. Pierre Lalive & Laura Halonen, On the Availability of Counterclaims 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in CZECH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 141, 154 (Alexander J. Bělohlávek & Naděžda Rozehnalová eds., vol. II 
2011). 
 12. See Yaraslau Kryvoi, Piercing the Corporate Veil in International 
Arbitration, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 169 (2011) (discussing how 
undercapitalized local subsidiaries often appear as claimants in arbitral 
proceedings, and complicate the prospect of obtaining and enforcing arbitral 
awards against properly capitalized parent companies). 
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by ICSID or UNCITRAL tribunals.13 Although investment 
treaties are typically concluded in the interest of investors, they 
usually provide for broad jurisdiction over disputes concerning 
an investment and do not restrict the parties’ obligations to 
only those contained in the investment treaties.14
Obligations of investors arise not from the express 
language of treaties, but out of applicable law, stipulated either 
in the investment treaty, arbitration agreement or determined 
by the investor-state tribunal.
  
15 This Article demonstrates that 
investor obligations may arise under sources of international 
law other than investment treaties, such as general principles 
of law.16 Secondary sources of international law such as case 
law and scholarly writings also serve as evidence of 
international law rules applicable to investors.17 Under certain 
circumstances, relevant investor obligations can also be found 
in investment contracts with States.18
The next part of this Article provides an overview of 
counterclaims, which States asserted under the rules of IUSCT, 
ICSID, and UNCITRAL. Part III sets forth the main problems 
related to the requirement of investor consent to counterclaims. 
Finally, Part IV demonstrates that substantive obligations of 
investors can be found in sources of international law other 
than investment treaties, and with certain limitations, in 
investor-state contracts.  
 
 
 13. See, e.g., Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 31/98, 
art. 19.3 (Dec. 15, 1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules]; 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, art. 46,  Oct. 16, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 17 U.S.T. 
1270 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; THE ARBITRATION INST. OF THE 
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF THE ARBITRATION INSTITUTE 
OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,  art. 10.3, available at 
http://www.sccinstitute.se/filearchive/1/13207/1999_web_a4_vanliga_2004_eng
_rev_2005.pdf [hereinafter STOCKHOLM ARBITRATION RULES]; INT’L CTR. FOR 
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION 
PROCEEDINGS, rule 40 [hereinafter ICSID ARBITRATION RULES]; INT’L 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION, art. 5(5) [hereinafter ICC 
ARBITRATION RULES]. 
 14. See infra p. 232. 
 15. See infra p. 232. 
 16. See infra pp. 248–50.  
 17. See infra pp. 250–51.  
 18. See infra pp. 239–42.  
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II. PROCEDURAL RULES FOR ASSERTING 
COUNTERCLAIMS  
A. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES AND COUNTERCLAIMS  
A counterclaim in investor-state disputes is a claim 
submitted by a respondent in opposition to the claimant’s 
claim.19 Since investors initiate nearly all investor-state 
disputes,20
First, although investment treaties are inherently 
asymmetrical and provide investors with rights but not 
obligations, States can initiate and submit counterclaims, 
which facilitate equality between the parties.
 counterclaims are typically submitted by host 
States. Counterclaims make investor-state arbitration more 
efficient for a number of reasons.  
21
All major arbitration rules require that counterclaims 
relate to the substance of the already initiated dispute.
 Second, 
counterclaims arising from separate but related agreements 
between the parties enhance time-efficient dispute resolution. 
22 
Typically, counterclaims have a defensive nature and purport 
to undermine the primary claim.23
 
 19. Black’s Law Dictionary defines counterclaim as “[a] claim presented 
by a defendant in opposition to or deduction from the claim of the plaintiff.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 349 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 13). See 
generally CHRISTIANA FOUNTOULAKIS, SET-OFF DEFENCES IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2010), for a discussion 
of set-off defences and counterclaims in the context of international arbitration 
claims. 
 In the majority of cases in 
which counterclaims were presented they related to the main 
 20. See The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2011-1), INT’L CTR. FOR 
SETTLEMENT INV. DISP., available at http://icsid.worldbank.org. 
 21. See, e.g., Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development on the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, art. 13, 
Mar. 18, 1965 (as amended on Apr. 10, 2006), available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/Rulesmain.jsp (“The convention 
permits the institution of proceedings by host States as well as by investors 
and the executive directors have constantly had in mind that the provisions of 
the convention should be equally adapted to the requirements of both cases.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Claims Settlement Declaration Art II, para. 1, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. 9 (1983) (stating that counterclaims from the IUSCT should relate 
to the matter of the main claims); Commission on International Trade Law, 
G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 21.3 (Dec. 15, 1976) (as amended in 2010) (stating that 
counterclaims should be within the tribunal’s jurisdiction); ICSID 
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 13, rule 40 (stating that counter claims must 
arise “directly out of the subject matter of the dispute”). 
 23. CHRISTOPH SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A 
COMMENTARY 750 (2d ed. 2010).  
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substance of the case and were not of an incidental nature.24
Given the high cost of resolving disputes in international 
arbitration,
  
25 time-efficient dispute resolution is particularly 
important for less developed countries. As the dissenting 
opinion in a recent ICSID case, Roussalis v. Romania, pointed 
out, rejection of jurisdiction over counterclaims may direct the 
State to its domestic courts and if the judgment would be 
adverse to the investor, another bilateral investment treaty 
(BIT) claim may follow.26 That would result in a duplication of 
proceedings, inefficiency, and increased transaction costs.27
Host States may also be interested in counterclaims 
because international arbitration offers superior international 
enforcement prospects compared to domestic court judgments. 
ICSID arbitration awards do not require any additional 
procedures for recognition or enforcement: State parties to the 
ICSID Convention are obligated to enforce the pecuniary 
obligations imposed by that award within their territories as if 
it were a final judgment of a court in that State.
 
28  Most other 
awards, such as those rendered under UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, can be enforced under the 1958 New York Convention, 
which also provides for limited grounds on which awards might 
be denied enforcement.29
There is also a fairness argument. Many suggest that 
foreign investors often have economic muscle that most host 
States can hardly surpass.
   
30
It would be inequitable if, by reason of the invocation of ICSID 
jurisdiction, the [foreign investor] could on the one hand 
 It appears that an unfair 
asymmetry would arise if the investor could sue the host State 
for breach of its obligations while the State may not do the 
same. As the tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan put it:  
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See, e.g., Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 310 (Aug. 27, 2008), 
http://italaw.com/documents/PlamaBulgariaAward.pdf (stating the legal costs 
to the claimant (related to both the jurisdiction and merits phases of the 
arbitration), amounted to $4.6 MM, while the respondent’s legal costs (for both 
phases) were $13.2 MM). 
 26. Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 (2011) 
(Separate Opinion of Michael Reisman). 
 27. Id.  
 28. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 54.1.  
 29. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, art. III, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
New York Convention].  
 30. See, e.g., Karl-Heinz Boeckstiegel, Enterprise v State: the New David 
and Goliath?, 23 ARB. INT’L 93, 95 (2007). 
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elevate its side of the dispute to international adjudication 
and, on the other, preclude the [host State] from pursuing its 
own claim for damages . . . .
31
Host States can now assert counterclaims against investors 
under all major arbitration rules.
 
32 Most notably, counterclaims 
have been asserted under IUSCT, ICSID, and UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules. Despite the view expressed in the literature 
that counterclaims always fail,33
B. IRAN-US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 
 the next sections show that 
this is not always the case.  
To date, the largest number of counterclaims asserted by 
States has been under the rules of the IUSCT.34
. . . established for the purpose of deciding claims of 
nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of 
nationals of Iran against the United States, and any 
counterclaim which arises out of the same contract, 
transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject 
matter of that national’s claim . . . .
 The Claims 
Settlement Declaration, which constitutes the basis of IUSCT 
jurisdiction, provides that it was  
35
The IUSCT case law suggests that jurisdiction over a 
counterclaim depends entirely on the presence of jurisdiction 
over the claim.
  
36 If jurisdiction over the claim fails, related 
counterclaims should also be dismissed.37 If, however, the 
tribunal asserts its jurisdiction over the counterclaim, it can 
stand alone, even if the main claim has been withdrawn.38
 
 31. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Procedural Order No. 2, 395 (Oct. 16, 
2002), 8 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 293. 
   
 32. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 13, art. 19.3; 
ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 46; STOCKHOLM ARBITRATION RULES, 
supra note 13, art. 10.3; ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 13, rule 40; 
ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 13, art. 5(5).  
 33. See, e.g., Ana Vohryzek-Griest, State Counterclaims in Investor-State 
Disputes: A History of 30 Years of Failure, 15 INT’L L., REVISTA COLOMBIANA 
DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 83, 84 (2009) (“State counterclaims in investor-
State disputes always fail”).  
 34. See generally, CHARLES NELSON BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, 
THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1998) (discussing the genesis, 
structure, and results of the IUSCT).  
 35. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 22, at 1.  
 36. See, e.g, Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Iran, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 79, 146–48 (1989).  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
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Because IUSCT jurisdiction is defined in rather broad 
terms, thousands of counterclaims have been filed at the 
IUSCT.39 They have included counterclaims for advanced 
payments, breach of contract, services rendered, defective 
products, and other categories; all arising out of investor 
contractual obligations.40
C. ICSID CONVENTION  
   
The 1966 ICSID Convention enabled private investors to 
submit claims against States without intervention of their 
respective national governments.41 The Convention and the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules provide ICSID with jurisdiction over 
counterclaims.42
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if 
requested by a party, determine any incidental or additional 
claims or counterclaims arising directly out of the subject 
matter of the dispute provided that they are within the scope 
of the consent of the parties and are otherwise within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre.
 Article 46 of the ICSID Convention stipulates:  
43
The ICSID Convention’s drafting history suggests that the 
reason for the inclusion of counterclaims in the Convention was 
to eliminate the necessity of separate proceedings.
  
44 The 
drafters emphasized that counterclaims should be covered by 
consent of the parties and should not go beyond the tribunal’s 
competence.45 According to the Report of the Executive 
Directors of the World Bank, the Convention is meant to be 
equally adapted to the requirements of the institution of 
proceedings brought by investors as well as by host States.46
Until now, most State counterclaims against foreign 
investors asserted under ICSID rules were for costs arising out 
   
 
 39. BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 34, at 99.  
 40. Id.  
 41. YARASLAU KRYVOI, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 26–30 (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 2010). 
 42. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 46; ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, 
supra note 13, art. 40. 
 43. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 46. 
 44. 2 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE 
ORIGIN AND THE FORMATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 
270 (2001). 
 45. Id. at 337, 422. 
 46. Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, ¶ 13, ICSID/15 (Mar. 18, 1965) [hereinafter ICSID Report]. 
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of non-ICSID proceedings,47 interest payments,48 or taxes.49  In 
a majority of ICSID cases, tribunals asserted jurisdiction over 
counterclaims but subsequently denied them on the merits.50  
In a few other cases, tribunals agreed with the merits of 
counterclaims asserted by States.51
D. UNCITRAL ARBITRAL RULES 
  
The 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are commonly 
used in investor-state disputes.52 Counterclaims in UNCITRAL 
investor-state disputes have been rare, which is a consequence 
of a rather narrow scope of jurisdiction of investment tribunals 
under the old version of the rules.53 Until 2010, these rules 
provided that the respondent could only bring a counterclaim 
“arising out of the same contract.”54
In its statement of defense, or at a later stage in the arbitral 
proceedings if the arbitral tribunal decides that the delay 
was justified under the circumstances, the respondent may 
make a counterclaim or rely on a claim for the purpose of a 
 Currently, the rules, in 
relevant part, provide as follows: 
 
 47. See, e.g., Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic 
of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Award, 76 (Jan. 6, 1988), 4 ISCID Rep. 
61 (1997). 
 48. See, e.g., Benvenuti and Bonfant Srl v. Government of the People’s 
Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/77/2, Award, ¶ 3.5 (Aug. 15, 
1980), 1 ISCID Rep. 330 (1993). 
 49. See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/81/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, 562–64 (May 10, 1988), 1 ICSID Rep. 
543 (1993). 
 50. See, e.g., Alex Genin v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 
Award, ¶¶ 196–201 (June 25, 2001), 17 ICSID Rev. 395 (2002); Southern 
Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/84/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, (Nov. 27, 1985), 3 ICSID Rep. 112 
(1995); Klöckner Industrie–Anlagen GmbH v. Republic of Cameroon, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/81/2, Award, 16 (Oct. 21, 1983), 2 ICSID Rep. 9 (1994); 
Benvenuti and Bonfant Srl, 1 ISCIS Rep. ¶¶ 4.95–4.96; Adriano Gardella SpA 
v. Government of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, ICSID Case No. ARB/74/1, 
Award, (Aug. 29, 1977), 1 ICSID Rep. 283 (1993).  
 51. See, e.g., Maritime International Nominees Establishment, 4 ISCID 
Rep. at 76 (addressing counterclaims for the recovery of legal expenses 
incurred by the government because of the investor's non-compliance with the 
tribunal's recommendation).  
 52. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 13. 
 53. See, e.g., Zeevi Holdings v. Republic of Bulgaria, UNCITRAL, Final 
Award, (Oct. 25, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/ZeeviHoldingsv.Bulgaria-
FinalAward.pdf; Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 
Decision on Jurisdiction Over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, ¶¶ 78–79 
(May 7, 2004), 15 ICSID Rep. 256 (2010). 
 54. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 13, art. 19.3.  
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set-off provided that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction 
over it.
55
The requirement that a dispute should arise out of the 




As this review of major arbitration rules suggests, investor-
state tribunals can assert jurisdiction over counterclaims. 
There is, however, a legitimate question of whether investors 
consent to such counterclaims, because most investment 
treaties do not provide for any obligations of foreign investors 
and are generally concluded for the benefit of foreign investors 
who usually initiate arbitral proceedings. 
 More counterclaims are likely to be 
asserted by States now that the rules have been revised.  
III. CONSENT TO COUNTERCLAIMS  
A. INVESTOR CONSENT TO COUNTERCLAIMS  
Historically, the main aim of investment treaties and 
contracts was to moderate the exercise of sovereign power by 
host States.57 Only States have a monopoly on using force to 
regulate activities of all economic actors in their own territory. 
The idea behind investment treaties is that it is the conduct of 
States, rather than the conduct of investors, which needs to be 
kept in check.58
Today most treaties explicitly provide that their main goal 
is to protect investors and facilitate foreign investments.
  
59 
Investors are privileged and “traditionally [have been] afforded 
rights without being subject to obligations. . . .”60
Investors’ legal position under investment treaties can be 
compared to that of third party beneficiaries in contracts—they 
   
 
 55. Commission on International Trade Law, supra note 22, art. 21.3.  
 56. See JAN PAULSSON & GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, REVISION OF THE 
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (2006), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/arbrules_report.pdf. 
 57. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International 
Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 193 (2005).  
 58. See Gustavo Laborde, The Case for Host State Claims in Investment 
Arbitration, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 97, 98 (2010). 
 59. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
U.K.–Kaz., Preamble, Nov. 23, 1995, GR. BRIT. T.S. NO. 30 (1996) (Cm. 3176) 
(“Desiring to create favourable conditions for greater investment by nationals 
and companies of one State in the territory of the other State.”).  
 60. MARC JACOB, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 21 (2010). 
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have rights but not obligations.61 Treaties typically only enable 
the investor, rather than the State, to submit claims to 
arbitration.62 Investment treaties typically neither provide for 
the submission of a State’s counterclaims nor even mention the 
right of an investor to submit counter-claims.63 Some scholars 
even dub investment arbitration as an international “ ’quasi-
judicial review’ of national regulatory action.”64
Like all international treaties, investment treaties are 
supposed to be interpreted in light of their object and purpose.
  
65  
In the absence of any specific language providing for a 
possibility of counterclaims against foreign investors, allowing 
such counterclaims may seem problematic. Consent remains a 
cornerstone of the system of international adjudication in 
general66 and investor-state arbitration in particular.67
If the investor limited its acceptance of jurisdiction to 
claims based on the treaty, should only the treaty be the source 
of rights and obligations in a particular dispute? To answer this 
question, it is important to understand that the investment 
treaty itself is not the basis for the tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
Investors are not parties to international treaties, and 
therefore, cannot consent to arbitration in such treaties.  
  
When a State enters into an investment treaty, it offers 
eligible investors a right to arbitrate any relevant investment 
disputes through international arbitration.68
 
 61. Laborde, supra note 
 If the investor 
chooses to accept the offer, it usually does so by initiating 
arbitration proceedings, thereby perfecting the parties’ 
58, at 112.  
 62. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, Greece–Rom., May 23, 1997, art. 9.2.  
 63. See id.  
 64. Hege Elisabeth Veenstra–Kjos, Counter-claims by Host States in 
Investment Dispute Arbitration “Without Privity”, in NEW ASPECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 597, 600 (Philippe Kahn & Thomas W. 
Wälde eds., 2007); see also Gus van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 121 (2006). 
 65. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.1, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”). 
 66. ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 23 (1991).  
 67. See ICSID Report, supra note 46, ¶ 23.  
 68. See LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID 
ARBITRATION 35 (2004); Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID 
REV. – FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 232 (1995). 
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agreement to arbitrate the investment dispute.69 An investor’s 
consent to arbitration can also be manifested in a separate 
agreement with the State to arbitrate a claim under the 
investment treaty.70
 Such consent typically incorporates by reference a certain 
set of arbitration rules, which the parties agree to apply in full. 
Neither such agreements nor requests for arbitration usually 
contain an express reference to counterclaims.
 
71 But narrow 
wording of acceptance of the offer to arbitrate disputes should 
not have the effect of excluding State counterclaims because [a] 
BIT is not an á la carte selection of provisions among which the 
investor can chose.72 If the arbitration rules include the procedural 
right to submit counterclaims,73 the parties are bound by it.74
Moreover, in a number of disputes, States themselves 




In AMTO v. Ukraine, a dispute arose on the basis of the 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and the Rules of the Arbitration 
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC).
 which makes the submission of 
counterclaims a less controversial issue. But as the analysis 
below suggests the narrow wording of a relevant dispute 
resolution treaty provision may affect the tribunal’s subject 
matter jurisdiction.  
76
Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of 
another Contracting Party relating to an Investment of the 
latter in the Area of the former, which concern an alleged 
breach of an obligation of the former under [the ECT].
 ECT 
contains no mentioning of the right to counterclaim and covers 
only disputes arising out of obligations of States:  
77
 
 69. See REED ET AL., supra note 
 
68, at 35; Paulsson, supra note 68.  
 70. See REED ET AL., supra note 68, at 36; Paulsson, supra note 68.  
 71. Lalive & Halonen, supra note 11, at 149. 
 72. Id. at 150. 
 73. As explained above, the ICSID Convention, UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, and other arbitration rules explicitly provide for the right to assert 
counterclaims. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
 74. See Pierre A. Karrer, Jurisdiction on Set–off Defences and 
Counterclaims, 67 Arb. 176, 177 (2001) (“[A]n arbitral tribunal should have 
jurisdiction over counterclaims between the same parties, even if these 
counterclaims are not covered by the arbitration agreement which confers 
jurisdiction on the arbitral tribunal over the main claim [. . .].”).  
 75. Laborde, supra note 58, at 100. 
 76. Limited Liability Company AMTO v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 
080/2005, Final Award, (Mar. 26, 2008), 
http://italaw.com/documents/AmtoAward.pdf. 
 77. Energy Charter Treaty art. 26.1, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360 
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The State relied on Article 10 of the SCC rules and 
asserted a counterclaim for non-material injury to its 
reputation.78
. . . the jurisdiction of an Arbitral Tribunal over a State 
Party counterclaim under an investment treaty depends 
upon the terms of the dispute resolution provision of the 
treaty, the nature of the counterclaim and the relationship of 
the counterclaims with the claims in arbitration.
 The tribunal ruled that counterclaims were 
outside of its jurisdiction because the State failed to specify the 
basis for its counterclaim in applicable law:  
79
The tribunal in that case decided it could not go beyond its 
subject matter jurisdiction and declined to assert jurisdiction 
over the counterclaim.
 
80  Had the ECT covered a wider category 
of disputes or provided for investor obligations, the outcome 
could have been different.81
The ICSID tribunal in Roussalis v. Romania recently 
rejected respondent’s counterclaim on the basis of an absence of 
the investor’s consent.
  
82 The tribunal focused on the dispute 
resolution clause of the BIT, which provided for resolution of 
disputes concerning obligations of the State.83
The majority in that case reasoned that the relevant BIT 
language which refers to “disputes . . . concerning an obligation 
of the latter” limited jurisdiction to claims brought by investors 




[hereinafter ECT].  
 The arbitrators further 
 78. AMTO, SCC Case No. 080/2005 §§ 116–18. The SCC Arbitration Rules 
provided for the right to counterclaim. See STOCKHOLM ARBITRATION RULES, 
supra note 13, art. 10.  
 79. AMTO, SCC Case No. 080/2005 § 118. 
 80. Id. 
 81. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may also 
present the same problem. The NAFTA dispute settlement clause is limited to 
obligations under specified articles of NAFTA. Under Articles 1116 and 1117 
of NAFTA, the only claims which may be submitted to arbitration are claims 
alleging that another NAFTA Party has breached an obligation under 
specified articles of Chapter 11. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 82. Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶¶ 
864–76 (Dec. 7, 2011), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC2431_En&caseId=C70.  
 83. The Romania-Greece BIT provided for jurisdiction in “[d]isputes 
between an investor of a Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party 
concerning an obligation of the latter under this Agreement, in relation to an 
investment of the former.” Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, supra note 62, art. 9.1. 
 84. Spyridon Roussalis, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 ¶ 869. 
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explained that “where the BIT does specify that the applicable 
law is the BIT itself, counterclaims fall outside the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.”85 Because the BIT did not impose any obligations 
on the investor, counterclaims, according to the majority, fall 
outside of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.86
Professor Michael Reisman wrote a sharp dissent in 
Roussalis v. Romania in which he criticized the majority’s 
refusal to consider counterclaims on the merits as “an ironic, if 
not absurd, outcome, at odds . . . with the objectives of 
international investment law.”
  
87 In his view, consent to ICSID 
jurisdiction ipso facto includes consent to Article 46 of the 
ICSID Convention, which provides for the right to counterclaim 
both to the State and to the investor.88
The Resiman’s position is not unprecedented. The ICSID 
tribunal in Hamester v. Ghana considered a BIT clause similar 
to the one in Romania v. Roussalis which provided that the 
parties consent to disputes “concerning an obligation of [the 
host State] under this Treaty in relation to an investment of [a 
national or company of the other Contracting Party].”
  
89 Strict 
treaty interpretation would suggest that counterclaims would 
not fall under the tribunal’s jurisdiction because the investor 
was not a party to the treaty and the treaty did not provide for 
obligations of investors. The tribunal, however, observed that 
under this treaty a State could also be an aggrieved party and 
refer disputes to arbitration.90
In another case, Saluka v. Czech Republic, the relevant 
dispute resolution clause covered a much wider spectrum of 
 
 
 85. Id. ¶ 871.  
 86. Id. The Majority’s view that the BIT is the applicable law seems 
controversial because the parties explicitly chose Romanian law to govern the 
merits of the dispute. Id. ¶ 306. Additionally, provisions of the BIT establish 
that “the applicable rules and principles of international law” should apply to 
the dispute. Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, supra note 62, art. 9.4. 
 87. Spyridon Roussalis, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 (Separate Opinion of 
Michael Reisman).  
 88. See id. 
 89. Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/24, Award, ¶ 354 (June 18, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/documents/Hamesterv.GhanaAward.pdf (quoting Treaty for 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.–Ghana, 
Feb. 24, 1995, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_ghana.gr.pdf). 
 90. Gustav F W Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24 ¶¶ 351–52. 
Eventually the tribunal ruled not to consider counterclaims any further, 
because the State failed to properly submit on the nature of counterclaims 
under the BIT. Id. ¶ 355. 
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disputes, specifically: “[a]ll disputes between one Contracting 
Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party 
concerning an investment of the latter.”91
The language of Article 8, in referring to ‘All disputes,’ is 
wide enough to include disputes giving rise to counterclaims, 
so long, of course, as other relevant requirements are also 
met.
 The tribunal 
explained: 
92
This analysis of case law suggests that if the relevant 
dispute resolution treaty provision is broad enough and is not 
limited to obligations specifically provided by the treaty, the 
tribunals are more likely to assert counterclaims against 
investors. But as explained below, even in the context of 
broadly formulated dispute resolution clauses, not all investor 




B. CONSENT TO COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST AFFILIATED 
COMPANIES 
  
Does foreign investor consent cover counterclaims against 
affiliated parties, such as a parent company? Often the formal 
claimant in arbitral proceedings is a local subsidiary 
incorporated as a distinct corporate entity.94 Its parent 
company is protected from the subsidiary’s obligations by the 
principle of limited liability.95
 
 91. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic, art. 8, Apr. 9, 1991, 2242 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter 
Netherlands Agreement]. 
 These local subsidiaries could be 
undercapitalized and unable to pay any award rendered 
 92. Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on 
Jurisdiction Over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, ¶ 39 (May 7, 2004), 15 
ICSID Rep. 256 (2010). The Saluka tribunal subsequently decided that it had 
no jurisdiction over the counterclaim, primarily because of the lack of a close 
connection between the original claim and the counterclaim, which the 
tribunal deemed to be a matter of Czech law and not something that fell under 
the Agreement. See id. ¶¶ 79–82. 
 93. See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 94. See, e.g., Pierre Lalive, The First ‘World Bank’ Arbitration (Holiday 
Inns v. Morocco)—Some Legal Problems, 51(1) BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 123, 128 
(1980) (explaining that the claimant in Holiday Inns v. Morocco was a 
subsidiary that had not been fully formed at the time the agreement was 
made, but that the tribunal still recognized its jurisdiction over the claim); see 
also Kryvoi, supra note 12, at 184–86. 
 95. See, e.g., Kryvoi, supra note 12, at 171–73 (explaining that limited 
liability is one of the main rationales behind the corporate form and that 
creating subsidiary companies can further shield business owners from risk). 
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against them.96 It may be difficult, if at all possible, to make a 
parent company with deeper pockets a party to arbitral 
proceedings.97
When a State-affiliated entity signs a contract, investors 
can extend the clause to the State as a whole. The 
International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility 
explain when an entity is considered to be acting with the 
authority of the State.  
 
An entity whose structure, function, and control flows from 
governmental authority, as well as the conduct of persons 
empowered by the State to “exercise elements of the 
governmental authority,” is considered to be acting with the 
authority of the State “provided the person or entity is acting in 
that capacity in the particular instance.”98
An ICSID tribunal analyzed whether to pierce the 
corporate veil when faced with asserted counterclaims in 
Klöckner v. Cameroon.
  It is more difficult 
for States to counterclaim against corporations that have not 
signed the arbitration agreement. This is yet another 
manifestation of the pro-investor asymmetry of investor-state 
arbitration. 
99 The tribunal asserted its jurisdiction 
and permitted the State to assert a counterclaim that involved 
a locally incorporated subsidiary, SOCAME.100
 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 173 (“A typical corporate veil piercing case involves a 
controlling shareholder who sets up an undercapitalized corporation to incur 
obligations to a third party.”). 
 The 
Cameroonian government signed several agreements with the 
claimant, Klöckner, and its domestically incorporated company, 
 97. See id. for a more detailed discussion of piercing the corporate veil. 
 98. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 
83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/83, art. 5 (Jan. 
28, 2002). But not all affiliated entities’ actions are regarded as actions of the 
State; instead, only those actions where the State acts as a sovereign. See, e.g., 
Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret VE Sanay A.S. v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, ICSID  Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, ¶ 444 (Aug. 27, 2009), 
http://italaw.com/documents/Bayandiraward.pdf (“[T]his inquiry consists in 
examining whether the alleged interference with the property or the rights of 
the investor has been made in the State’s exercise of its sovereign powers.”); 
Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 253 
(Feb. 6, 2007), 14 ICSID Rep. 518 (2009) (“[F]or the State to incur 
international responsibility it must act as such, it must use its public 
authority.”); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 547 
(2008). 
 99. Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Republic of Cameroon, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/81/2, Award, 13–18 (Oct. 21, 1983), 2 ICSID Rep. 9 (1994). 
 100. See id. at 15–16 (noting that the subsidiary SOCAME was under 
foreign control at the time the agreements were signed between the parties, 
which brought it under the arbitration agreement). 
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SOCAME, which stipulated that ICSID arbitration would be 
used in the event of disputes.101 When the issue of 
counterclaims against a locally incorporated company arose, 
the arbitrators focused on subject matter jurisdiction over the 
contract to ultimately allow the counterclaims to move forward, 
instead of focusing on ICSID’s personal jurisdiction over a non-
signatory to the arbitration agreement.102
The Klöckner tribunal explained that the main question 
was not whether the tribunal had jurisdiction “ratione 
personae” over the locally incorporated company,
   
103 but rather 
whether it had jurisdiction “ratione materiae” on the 
application and interpretation of the Establishment 
Agreement.104 The tribunal concluded that the contracts 
entered into by a local subsidiary establish the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal with respect to the counterclaim because there was 
a direct connection between the contracts and the parties’ 
claims.105
In Saluka v. Czech Republic, a UNCITRAL case, the 
investor contended that the tribunal had no personal 
jurisdiction over the entity against which the State asserted a 
counterclaim because that entity had never consented to be a 
party to the arbitration.
 
106 The State responded that if the 
locally incorporated entity was permitted to represent the 
interests of the foreign parent company in arbitration, a 
counterclaim could be asserted against the foreign parent 
company.107
 
 101. See id. at 13–18 (detailing the different agreements signed between 
the companies and Cameroon, and the resulting disputes). 
 The State asked to pierce the corporate veil and 
treat both companies as “the same single group of companies” 
 102. Id. at 17 (“The question before the present Tribunal is . . . to 
determine whether it has jurisdiction ‘ratione materiae’ to rule on the 
application and interpretation of the Establishment Agreement.”). 
 103. See id. (explaining that the foreign company was acting through the 
local company, meaning that the contract was actually between the foreign 
company and the host country, Cameroon).  
 104. See id. (noting that the Establishment Agreement should be taken 
together with the Protocol of Agreement and the Supply Contract, which when 
combined give the Arbitral Tribunal jurisdiction). 
 105. Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Republic of Cameroon, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/81/2, Award, 8 (Oct. 21, 1983), 2 ICSID Rep. 9 (1994) (“The 
three contracts establish the jurisdiction of the tribunal with respect to the 
counterclaim, given the direct connection between the three instruments and 
the parties’ claims.”). 
 106. Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on 
Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, ¶ 25 (May 7, 2004), 15 
ICSID Rep. 256 (2010). 
 107. Id. ¶ 29. 
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to redress abuse of the corporate form.108
the relationship between [the affiliated companies] is 
sufficiently close to enable the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in 
proceedings instituted by [the local subsidiary] to extend to 
claims against [the parent company].
 The Saluka tribunal 
refrained from ruling on the issue of piercing the corporate veil 
and merely assumed that  
109
The tribunal ultimately held that it did not have 
jurisdiction for two reasons: first, because there was an absence 
of a close connection between the primary claim and the 
counterclaim;
  
110 and second, because the contract established a 
special dispute resolution procedure for the issues contested in 
the counterclaim.111
It appears that tribunals are reluctant to pierce the 
corporate veil in the counterclaim context because 
counterclaims may fall outside of the parties’ consent to 
arbitration. Even if a tribunal decides to assert jurisdiction 
over affiliated companies, the party enforcing the resulting 
award may face serious challenges.
 
112 Enforcing awards against 
parent companies located in other countries in the absence of 
their explicit consent to arbitration requires piercing the 
corporate veil, which can be problematic under applicable 
arbitration rules, relevant domestic law, and the New York 
Convention.113 The only exception is an award granted under 
the ICSID Convention.  Such award should be enforced as if it 
is a final judgment of a domestic court of that State.114
 
 108. Id. 
  
 109. Id. ¶ 44. 
 110. Id. ¶¶ 47–82 (“[T]he disputes which have given rise to the 
Respondent’s counterclaim are not sufficiently closely connected with the 
subject matter of the original claim put forward by Saluka to fall within the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction.”). But see Lalive & Halonen, supra note 11, at 157 
(“[C]ommentators have also criticised the connection required in Klöckner and 
Saluka as being too demanding, suggesting that a close factual nexus should 
be enough or that the fact that the counterclaim arises from the same 
‘investment’ as the claim suffices.”); ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 260–63 (2009) (explaining the different outcomes 
in different tribunals in regards to the requirement of a “requisite nexus”). 
 111. Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on 
Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, ¶¶ 47–82 (May 7, 2004), 
15 ICSID Rep. 256 (2010).  
 112. See, e.g., Kryvoi, supra note 12, 175–77 (explaining the different legal 
grounds on which an affiliated company party may assert in order to challenge 
an arbitration award). 
 113. Id. 
 114. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 54.1 (“A Contracting State with 
a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal 
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The next section analyzes in more detail whether foreign 
investors have not only rights but also international obligations 
vis-à-vis host States.  
IV. SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATIONS OF INVESTORS IN 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES  
A. INVESTORS AS BEARERS OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
According to the traditional doctrine of international law, 
only States, not individuals, can be the subjects of obligation 
and responsibility in international law.115 Until the second half 
of the Twentieth century, the dominant principle of 
international law was that a wrong done to a national of one 
State, for which another State was intentionally responsible, 
was not actionable by the injured national, but instead was 
only actionable by his State.116 Investors were not able to 
proceed with an international claim against a foreign 
government directly.117
In the past, foreign investors had to seek the diplomatic 
protection of their home State to support their case and to 
initiate proceedings before an international tribunal.
  
118 In 
recent years, the legal status of investors in international law 
has been shifting from this classical position to the recognition 
of an increased role of individual rights.119
 
courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a 
final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.”). 
  
 115. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  194 
(1966) (“The traditional doctrine that only states, not individuals, are the 
subjects of international law means that the personal sphere of validity of the 
international legal order is limited.”). 
 116. See generally Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, Diplomatic Protection of 
Shareholders in International Law, 4 PHIL. INT’L L.J. (1965) (explaining 
diplomatic and judicial protection in greater detail). 
 117. KELSEN, supra note 115, at 194 (discussing how the traditional 
doctrine of international law only conferred rights upon States, meaning that 
individuals did not have rights and therefore could not bring suit against 
States). 
 118. See KRYVOI, supra note 5, at 26 (explaining that investor inability to 
reach States through legal suits was one of the reasons for the formation of 
ICSID). 
 119.  See generally PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
AND THE LAW (2007) (discussing the evolving status of multinational 
enterprises); DAVID IJALAYE, THE EXTENSION OF INTERNATIONAL 
PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 221–37 (1978) (explaining that private 
companies doing foreign business have developed a legal footing similar to 
that of States, even though this position in international law is challenged by 
some). 
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One of earliest examples recognizing an individual’s civil 
responsibility is the International Convention for the 
Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, which provided that 
an individual who broke a submarine cable had an obligation to 
pay for the cost of repair of the cable.120 Individual 
responsibility is also recognized under international law, for 
example, in cases of piracy, breach of blockade, carriage of 
contraband, and acts of illegitimate warfare.121
In theory, subjects of international law are “persons to 
whom international law attributes rights and duties directly 
and not through the medium of their states.”
   
122 In the investor-
state context, tribunals assume that investors have the 
capacity to contract for the right to sue States in investor-state 
disputes.123 As the sole arbitrator in Texaco v. Libya explained: 
“[F]or the purposes of interpretation and performance of the 
contract, it should be recognized that a private contracting 
party has specific international capacities.”124
Individual investors can now initiate an action against a 
State before a tribunal, the jurisdiction of which the State is 
obliged to recognize.
  
125 Investor rights to sue States in investor-
state disputes was a significant advancement of the status of 
individuals compared to claims commissions, which States had 
previously used to resolve investor grievances.126 As discussed 
above, international law also imposes certain obligations on 
foreign investors directly that are not attributable through the 
medium of States.127
The primary source of investor obligations in international 
   
 
 120. International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph 
Cables art. IV, Mar. 4, 1884, T.S. No. 380, available at 
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1902/1884-convention-for-the-protection-of-submarine-
telegraph-cables/. 
 121. See IJALAYE, supra note 119, at 203–07. 
 122. Marek St. Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of 
Individuals, 50 AM. J. INT’L L. 533, 535 (1956). 
 123. See ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 67–72 (1991). 
 124. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./Cal. Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of 
the Libyan Arab Republic, Award, ¶ 47 (Jan. 19, 1977), 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978). 
 125. See, e.g., KELSEN, supra note 115, at 221–22 (“International law, 
especially a treaty, confers rights on individuals by authorizing private 
persons to bring a lawsuit against a state before a national or an international 
tribunal.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace with Italy art. 83, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 
1245 (establishing conciliation commissions); Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 
4, Sept. 8, 1951, 59 Stat. 1031 (establishing property commissions). 
 127. See supra notes 115–125 and accompanying text. 
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arbitration is the applicable law agreed upon by the parties.128 
Relevant international investment treaties may contain choice 
of law provisions. For instance, the treaty in Saluka v. Czech 
Republic provided for the use of the domestic law of the host 
State, provisions of the BIT and other agreements between the 
parties, “provisions of special agreements related to the 
investment,” and the “general principles of law.”129
B. DOMESTIC LAW AS A SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
 As explained 
below, investment treaties are often silent on the issue of 
applicable law and even when domestic law is chosen, not all 
domestic law obligations rise to a level arbitable at the 
international level.  
Investment treaties usually contain no provisions on the 
issue of applicable law.130 In some cases, investment treaties 
refer both to domestic law and international law as applicable 
law.131 In other cases, treaties are unclear about which law is 
applicable.132 According to the ICSID Convention, if the parties 
fail to agree on applicable law, the law of the host State 
applies.133 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as well as other 
institutional arbitration rules give discretion to the tribunal to 
determine what law should apply in such situations.134
Investor failure to comply with the laws of the host State 
may act to exclude the investment from protection under the 
investment treaty. For example, in Maffezini v. Spain, the 
tribunal held that the Argentine investor’s failure to comply 
with its environmental regulations constituted a violation of 
   
 
 128. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 42.1 (“The Tribunal shall decide 
a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. 
In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the 
Contracting State party . . . and such rules of international law as may be 
applicable.”). 
 129. Netherlands Agreement, supra note 91, art. 8.6. 
 130. See Antonio R. Parra, Applicable Law in Investor-State Arbitration, in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE 
FORDHAM PAPERS 2007 3, 7–8 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2007). 
 131. See, e.g., TAIDA BEGIC, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 232 (2005). 
 132. Id. (explaining that often treaties are written in a way that makes the 
parties’ choice of law “not . . . clear and explicit”). 
 133. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 42.1. 
 134. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 13, rule 35.1 (stipulating 
that the tribunal must apply the law that is chosen by the parties, but also 
noting that if the parties fail to identify which law should apply, the tribunal 
will elect the applicable law for them). 
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the investor’s obligations.135 In the 2006 case, Inceysa v. El 
Salvador, the tribunal declined jurisdiction on the basis of an 
investment treaty provision that the investment must be made 
in accordance with the laws of the host country.136 The tribunal 
held that an investment made through fraudulent means could 
not be made in accordance with law.137
Although applicable domestic law contemplates investor 
obligations, not all domestic law obligations rise to the level of 
international law obligations. Counterclaims arising out of the 
application of domestic law of general applicability usually fall 
outside of the international tribunals’ jurisdictions.  
 
For instance, in a number of cases before the IUSCT, Iran 
counterclaimed requesting allegedly unpaid taxes and social 
security contributions.138 The IUSCT tribunals usually held 
that such counterclaims arise not out of the contracts that were 
the subject matter of the investor’s claim, but out of the 
generally applicable domestic law.139 This approach remained 
the same even if the contract upon which a claim was based 
expressly allocated the burden to comply with such domestic 
law requirements to the claimant.140
A good example of an ICSID case with the same logic is 
Amco v. Indonesia, in which the State asserted a counterclaim 
seeking payment of taxes and customs duties.
  
141 Subsequently, 
Indonesia modified its counterclaim and alleged tax fraud.142
 
 135. See Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, 
(Nov. 13, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002). 
  
The tribunal eventually ruled that because the claim did not 
arise “directly out of an investment,” as required by the ICSID 
 136. Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/26, Award (Aug. 2, 2006), 
http://italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf. 
 137. Id. ¶¶ 230–64 (analyzing the fraudulent actions under international 
and El Salvadoran law). 
 138. Petrolane, Inc. v. Iran, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 64, ¶ 118 (1991); 
Questech, Inc. v. Ministry of Nat’l Def. of Islamic Republic of Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. 
Cl. Trib. Rep. 107, 134–36 (1985). 
 139. Petrolane, Inc., 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 64, ¶ 118; Questech, Inc., 9 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 134–36. 
 140.  See, e.g., Int’l Technical Prods. Corp. v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 206, 224–26 (1985). 
 141.  Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/81/1, Award, ¶¶ 283–87 (Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID Rep. 413 (1993). 
 142.  Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/81/1, Resubmitted Case: Decision on Jurisdiction, 562–64 (May 10, 1988), 
1 ICSID Rep. 543 (1993). The tribunal considered the tax fraud as a new claim 
because Indonesia did not introduce it as a counterclaim in accordance with 
ICSID Arbitration Rules. Id. at 564–65. 
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Convention, the tax fraud case was outside its jurisdiction.143
[I]t is correct to distinguish between rights and obligations 
that are applicable to legal or natural persons who are 
within the reach of a host State’s jurisdiction, as a matter of 
general law; and rights and obligations that are applicable to 
an investor as a consequence of an investment agreement 
entered into with that host State.  
  
The tribunal also distinguished between rights and obligations 
provided by the investment treaty and generally applicable 
rights and obligations:  
Legal disputes relating to the latter will fall under Article 
25(1) of the Convention. Legal disputes concerning the 
former, in principle, are to be decided by the appropriate 
procedures in the relevant jurisdiction unless the general 
law generates an investment dispute under the 
Convention.
144
The same logic on arbitrability of domestic law claims in 
investor-state arbitration appeared in Saluka v. Czech 
Republic, a dispute governed by UNCITRAL rules.
 
145 Like in 
Amco v. Indonesia, the tribunal emphasized that the 
counterclaims involved “non-compliance with the general law of 
the Czech Republic” and “rights and obligations which are 
applicable, as a matter of the general law of the Czech 
Republic, to persons subject to the Czech Republic’s 
jurisdiction.”146 The tribunal concluded that the counterclaims 
were to be decided not through the investment treaty 
settlement procedure, but through appropriate procedures 
under Czech law.147
More recently, a UNCITRAL tribunal was asked to decide 
a tax counterclaim in Paushok v. Mongolia.
  
148 The tribunal 
ruled the claim was outside its jurisdiction because the claim 
arose out of the public law of Mongolia.149
[T]hrough the Counterclaims the Respondent seeks to 
 It explained its 
decision:  
 
 143. Id. at 565. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on 
Jurisdiction over Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, ¶¶ 78–79 (May 7, 2004), 15 
ICSID Rep. 256 (2010) (applying UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules). 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. ¶ 79. 
 148.  See Sergei Paushok v. Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award 
on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 678 (Apr. 28, 2011), 
http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf. 
 149.  Id. ¶¶ 684–99. 
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extend the extraterritorial application and enforcement of 
its public laws, and in particular its tax laws, to 
individuals or entities not subject to and not having 
accepted to submit to Mongolian public law or its courts. 
Thus, if the Arbitral Tribunal extended its jurisdiction to 
the Counterclaims, it would be acquiescing to a possible 
exorbitant extension of Mongolia’s legislative jurisdiction 
without any legal basis under international law to do so, 
since the generally accepted principle is the non-
extraterritorial enforceability of national public laws and, 
specifically, of national tax laws.150
General measures such as tax or economic policy are 
normally outside the jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals as 
long as they do not result in a violation of prior international 
law commitments.
 
151 But if such measures have a specific effect 
on the violation of preexisting commitments, they may fall 
under the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.152
In summary, counterclaims can be based on domestic law 
obligations of investors only if those same obligations were 
specifically mentioned in the relevant investment treaty or 
otherwise committed to by the parties. Violation of purely 
domestic law obligations is usually insufficient for an investor-
state tribunal to extend its jurisdiction over counterclaims.  
 
C. CONTRACTS AS A SOURCE OF INVESTOR OBLIGATIONS 
Most investor-state disputes involve one or more contracts 
concluded between the foreign investor and the State. That 
could be a privatization contract, a concession contract, a 
license agreement, or other types of contract. Unlike 
investment treaties, these contracts also include concrete 
investor obligations in addition to obligations of States. It is 
important to understand whether obligations of investors 
arising out of contracts can fall under the jurisdiction of 
investor-state tribunals.  
 
 150. Id. ¶ 695. 
 151. See, e.g., Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, 
Award, ¶ 489 (Dec. 7, 2011), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC2431_En&caseId=C70; El Paso Energy International 
Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Apr. 27, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 488 (2006). For a UNCITRAL 
dispute, see GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, Final Award, ¶¶ 26–43 (Nov. 
15, 2004), 44 I.L.M. 545 (2005). 
 152. See, e.g., Spyridon Roussalis, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 ¶ 490; El Paso 
Energy International Co., 21 ICSID Rev. ¶ 97. 
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UNCITRAL and ICC arbitration rules provide that 
contract provisions should be taken into account when 
tribunals resolve disputes.153  The reason why most arbitration 
rules explicitly cover contractual obligations is that those rules 
were originally developed for resolution of purely contractual 
disputes between private parties. Even the ICSID Convention 
was adopted primarily with contractual disputes in mind—
when the Convention was finalized in 1965, there were almost 
no investment treaties.154 On the other hand, nothing in Article 
46 of the ICSID Convention implies that its purpose was only 
to encompass contractual disputes and to exclude investment 
treaty arbitrations.155
But it would be wrong to conclude that any obligations in 
contracts concluded between the foreign investor and the host 
State automatically rise to the level of being arbitrable by 
investor-state tribunals. As James Crawford suggested, 
contractual jurisdiction can be invoked under any sufficiently 
broad investment treaty dispute resolution clause as long as 
three conditions are met.
  
156 First, the contract should relate to 
an investment rather than being an ordinary contract for the 
supply of goods or services.157 Second, the contract should be 
with the State itself and not with a separate legal entity 
controlled by the State or a third party.158 Third, the contract 
with the State should not have its own dispute resolution 
clause.159
The same logic applies to counterclaims. States can assert 
counterclaims arising out of investor contractual obligations if 
there is a sufficiently broad investment treaty clause, and the 
investment contract with the State does not have its own 
dispute resolution mechanism.
   
160
 
 153.  UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 
 For instance, the Saluka v. 
13, art. 35.3; ICC 
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 13, art. 17.2. 
 154.  See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 1–10, 81–83, 129–30, 144–45 (1995). 
 155. Lalive & Halonen, supra note 11, at 143. 
 156.  James Crawford, Whewell Professor of Int’l Law, Univ. of Cambridge, 
Freshfields Lecture on Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 13 
(Nov. 29, 2007), available at 
http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures/pdf/Freshfields%20Lecture%202007.
pdf.  
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See, e.g., Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 
Decision on Jurisdiction over Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, ¶¶ 37–39, 55–57 
(May 7, 2004), 15 ICSID Rep. 256 (2010). 
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Czech Republic tribunal rejected jurisdiction over 
counterclaims arising from the Share Purchase Agreement 
because the agreement contained a separate dispute resolution 
clause.161
Subject matter jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals widens 
when treaty provisions guarantee the host State’s observance of 
all obligations or commitments entered into vis-à-vis foreign 
investors. These provisions are commonly known as umbrella 
clauses.
   
162 Umbrella clauses are often referred to as pacta sunt 
servanda clauses because their purpose is to ensure that 
contracts are respected.163 A typical umbrella clause provides 
that: “Each party shall observe any obligation it may have 
entered into with regard to investments.”164 According to Elihu 
Lauterpacht, the effect of umbrella clauses is to “put [investor-
state contracts] on a special plane in that breach of them 
becomes immediately a breach of convention.”165
The precise nature and effect of umbrella clauses is 
uncertain. Some commentators interpret them as protecting 
“the investor’s contractual rights against any interference 
which might be caused by either a simple breach of contract or 
by administrative or legislative acts.”
  
166 The application of this 
principle, however, does not explain whether umbrella clauses 
also cover purely commercial contracts.167 Some tribunals 
consider these clauses as automatically elevating the host 
State’s breaches of contract with investors to a treaty 
violation.168
 
 161. Id. ¶¶ 55–57. 
 Other tribunals rejected this interpretation without 
 162. See Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide between Developing 
and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 135, 142–50 (2006). 
 163. See id. at 142–43. 
 164.  Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of 
Investment, supra note 7, 31 I.L.M. at 130. 
 165.  Elihu Lauterpacht, The Drafting of Treaties for the Protection of 
Investment, in THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 18, 31 (1962). 
 166.  DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 154, at 81–82. 
 167.  U.N. Conference in Investment Rulemaking, at 74, 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5, U.N on Trade and Dev., Bilateral Investment 
Treaties 1995-2006: Trends. Sales No. E.06.II.D.16 (2007). 
 168.  See, e.g., Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the 
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 
¶¶ 113–29 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ISCID Rep. 518 (2005); Noble Ventures, Inc. v. 
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶¶ 46–62 (Oct. 12, 2005), 
http://italaw.com/documents/Noble.pdf. 
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explaining the meaning of the umbrella clauses.169
In the context of counterclaims, reliance on umbrella 
clauses to create investor obligations is problematic for another 
reason. Investment treaties usually provide that “Parties” (that 
is, States) should comply with their commitments.
   
170
To summarize, purely contractual investor obligations do 
not fall under the jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals. The 
State, however, may assert counterclaims under a sufficiently 
broad investment treaty clause if the investor breached its 
obligations under the investment contract concluded with the 
State.  
 Thus, in a 
strict sense umbrella clauses are not intended to impose any 
obligations on investors, only on States.  
D. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
a. Relevant Sources of International Law 
As discussed above, investment treaties often provide that 
domestic law and international law govern disputes between 
the State and the investor.171 In some cases, only international 
law governs substantive rights and obligations—for instance, 
the North American Free Trade Agreement172 and the Energy 
Charter Treaty173
A number of ICSID tribunals have explained that 
international law remains applicable in ICSID proceedings 
unless the parties have specifically excluded its application.
 provide for international law as the sole 
source of the applicable law.  
174 
If domestic law is chosen as applicable, international law plays 
a supplemental and corrective function.175
 
 169.  See, e.g., Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 
¶¶ 163–74 (Aug. 6, 2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406 (2005). 
 This means that 
international law fills the gaps in the host State’s laws, and if 
 170. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of 
Investment, supra note 7, 31 I.L.M. at 130. 
 171. See BEGIC, supra note 131, at 232. 
 172. NAFTA, supra note 81, 32 I.L.M. at 645. 
 173. ECT, supra note 77, 34 I.L.M. at 400. 
 174. See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/7, Award, ¶¶ 86–87 (May 25, 2004), 12 ICSID Rep. 6 (2007); Southern 
Pacific Properties (Middle E.) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/3, Award, ¶ 84 (May 20, 1992), 3 ICSID Rep. 189 (1995); Amco Asia 
Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Resubmitted 
Case: Award, ¶¶ 37–40 (May 31, 1990), 1 ICSID Rep. 569 (1993). 
 175. DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE 
CONVENTION, supra note 44, at 570–71, 985–86. 
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there is a conflict between international and domestic law, 
international law prevails.176  This principle is consistent with 
the general rule of international law under which States are 
not allowed to rely on domestic law to avoid performing their 
obligations under treaties.177
According to the Report of ICSID Executive Directors, the 
term ‘international law’ has the same meaning as Article 38(1) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
 
178
international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting 
states; 
 
Article 38(1) provides a classical definition of sources of 
international law:  
international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; 
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
. . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law.179
It is important to understand that parties in ICJ 




According to international law theory, self-contained 
regimes are interrelated wholes of primary and secondary rules 
that cover some particular problem differently from the way it 
would be covered under general law.
 Investor-state disputes are different 
because one party is not a sovereign. Therefore, general 
international law should be applied differently in the context of 
international investment law, which constitutes a self-
contained legal regime.  
181
 
 176.  See BEGIC, supra note 
 Examples of self-
131, at 155; Aaron Broches, The Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 387–93 (1972). 
 177.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 65, 1155 
U.N.T.S. at 339 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”). 
 178.  Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Report of the Executive 
Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (Mar. 18, 1965), compiled in ICSID 
Convention, Rules and Regulations, at 47, ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006), available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
 179. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 
59 stat. 1055. 
 180. Id. art. 34(1). 
 181. See generally Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification 
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contained regimes include WTO law or the law of diplomatic 
protection.182 A self-contained regime (lex specialis) provides 
interpretative guidance that in some ways deviates from the 
rules of general law (lex generalis).183
As the Iran-US Claims Tribunal explained in Amoco v 
Iran: 
   
As a lex specialis in relations between the two countries, the 
Treaty supersedes the lex generalis, namely customary 
international law . . . however . . . the rules of customary 
international law may be useful in order to fill in possible 
lacunae of the Treaty, to ascertain the meaning of undefined 
terms in its text or, more generally, to aid interpretation and 
implementation of its provisions.184
In the past, investor-state tribunals applied treaties, 
customary international law, and general principles of law in 




b. International Conventions 
 As the analysis below suggests, not all of these 
sources of international law help determine investor 
obligations.  
International conventions, and in particular investment 
treaties, are the first and foremost source of international law 
applied by investor-state tribunals. In addition to investment 
treaties, multilateral treaties such as NAFTA and ECT contain 
provisions for arbitration of investor-state disputes.186 They 
provide specific rights of foreign investors such as protection 
against expropriation and the right to fair and equitable 
treatment.187
It is not surprising that while treaties provide for investor 
rights, investor obligations are not there. Investors cannot be 
parties to international treaties concluded by States. Can 
 
 
and Expansion of International Law: Rep. of the Study Grp. of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n, 58th sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682, 68 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi). 
 182. Id. at 65–69. 
 183. Id. at 70.  
 184.  Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran, ¶ 112, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. 189 (1987). 
 185.  Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An 
Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 301, 309–14, 328–33 (2008). 
 186. ECT, supra note 77, 34 I.L.M. at 399–401; NAFTA, supra note 81, 32 
I.L.M. at 642–47. 
 187. ECT, supra note 77, 34 I.L.M. at 363; NAFTA, supra note 81, 32 
I.L.M. at 639–42. 
2012] COUNTERCLAIMS 245 
 
treaties, in principle, impose obligations on investors who are 
not parties to them? If treaties were treated as regular 
contracts, then no obligations could be imposed on third 
parties, only rights. According to a universally accepted 
principle of contract law, a third party cannot be subjected to a 
burden by a contract to which it is not a party.188
A number of developing countries advocate for inclusion of 
investor obligations directly in international investment 
agreements. In 2002, China, Cuba, India, Kenya, Pakistan, and 
Zimbabwe proposed that discussions on a multilateral 
framework on trade and investment also look at legally binding 
measures aimed at ensuring corporate responsibility and 
accountability relating to foreign investors.
   
189 In particular, 
they insisted on the need to comply with all domestic laws and 
regulations in all aspects of the economic and social lives of the 
host States in their activities.190
Investors, however, are already required to abide by 
domestic laws of the State in which they operate.  
   
This is a consequence not only of domestic law 
requirements, but also of the international law principle of 
territorial sovereignty.191 The host State, as a sovereign actor, 
can react to investor misconduct by unilaterally imposing 
sanctions and enforcing them against the assets of the 
investment project.192 This is a power the host State already 
possesses and that the foreign investor lacks.193 Although this 
principle is sometimes spelled out in international 
agreements,194
 
 188.  EWAN MCKENDRICK, CONTRACT LAW 133 (Marise Cremona ed., 4th 
ed. 2000).  
 it applies by virtue of public international law in 
 189.  See Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and 
Investment, Communication from China, Cuba, India, Kenya, Pakistan and 
Zimbabwe: Investors' and Home Governments’ Obligations, WT/WGTI/W/152 
(received Nov. 19, 2002). 
 190.  See id.  
 191.  See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 98, at 105–07 (explaining the 
concepts of territory, sovereignty, and territorial sovereignty).  
 192. See generally Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, “Indirect Expropriation" and the "Right to Regulate" in 
International Investment Law, Working Papers on International Investment 
Number 2004/4 (Sept. 2004), available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf (discussing how the scope of a host 
State’s power to regulate the rights and obligations of investors is 
determined). 
 193. See Brower & Schill, supra note 6, at 482. There are also situations in 
which investors do not keep sufficient assets in the host States which prevents 
this mechanism from working effectively. 
 194.  Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Framework Agreement on the 
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any event.195
Because investment and other treaties usually do not 
provide for specific investor obligations, such obligations should 
be looked for in other primary and secondary sources of 
international law such as international custom and general 
principles of law.  
  
c. International Custom 
If investor obligations are not set out in relevant treaties, 
or if their provisions are not sufficiently complete, the tribunal 
may refer to international custom unless the treaty refers to 
the application of different law (for example, domestic law).196
For instance, in ADC v. Hungary, the tribunal first applied 
the relevant investment treaty and then explained that consent 
to arbitration  
  
must also be deemed to comprise a choice for general 
international law, including customary international law, if 
and to the extent that it comes into play for interpreting and 
applying the provisions of the Treaty.197
According to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, international 
custom constitutes “evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law.”
 
198 The definition includes two basic elements—the actual 
behavior of States, and the psychological or subjective belief 
that such behavior is law.199
The ICSID Convention drafters discussed a number of 
rules of customary international law. These rules included the 




ASEAN Investment Area, art. 13 (Oct. 7, 1998) (allowing Member States to 
undertake any measures necessary to protect national security, public morals, 
the prevention of fraud or deceptive practices, and to ensure compliance with 
their tax obligations in the host jurisdiction). 
 protection against 
 195. See id. 
 196. Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, supra note 179. 
 197.  ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/16, Award, ¶ 290 (Oct. 2, 2006), 15 ICSID Rep. 534; see also Siemens 
AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 349 (Feb. 6, 
2007), 14 ICSID Rep. 518 (2009) (looking at customary international law to 
determine the standard of compensation for unlawful expropriation).  
 198.  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1055, 1060.  
 199.  Rajendra Ramlogan, The Environment and International Law: 
Rethinking the Traditional Approach, 3 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (2001–2002). 
 200.  Regional Consultative Meetings of Legal Experts on Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, Chairman’s Report on Issues Raised and Suggestions 
Made With Respect to the Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, art. IV, ¶ 
59, Z11 (July 9, 1964), in 2 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF 
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discriminatory treatment,201 the prohibition of measures 
contrary to international public policy,202 pacta sunt 
servanda,203 the exhaustion of local remedies,204 and rules on 
State succession.205
Do the most important rules of international customary 
law, known as jus cogens norms
 The ICSID Convention, however, mentions 
none of these principles. Moreover, it is difficult to apply these 
principles to investor conduct because they deal primarily with 
conduct of States rather than private parties such as investors.  
206 (for example, prohibition of 
genocide, slavery), affect obligations of investors? That would 
be problematic because only States (and individuals under 
certain circumstances), but not corporations, are responsible 
under international law for violations of such norms.207 
Moreover, corporate criminal liability generally exists neither 
in international law nor in the majority of domestic legal 
systems.208
The main problem in applying customary international law 
is that it develops as a result of interaction between States and 




INVESTMENT DISPUTES, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE 
FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION, 557 (International Center for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes, Washington, D.C., 1968).  
 not private 
investors. Customary international law affects interpretations 
 201.  See Settlement of Investment Disputes Consultative Meeting of Legal 
Experts, Summary Record of Proceedings, art. IV, at 51, Z9 (June 1, 1964), in 
2 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE 
CONVENTION, 367 (International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, Washington, D.C., 1968). 
 202. See Legal Committee on Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
Summary Proceedings of the Legal Committee Meeting, SID/LC/SR/14, art. 44, 
at 3 (Dec. 30, 1964) in 2 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE 
FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION, 799 (International Center for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes, Washington, D.C., 1968). 
 203. See id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 65, art. 53 (“[A] 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”). 
 207.  See, e.g., The I.G. Farben Trial, Case No. 57, The Judgment of the 
Tribunal X L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIMS. 30, 52 (1948).  
 208.  ILIAS BANTEKAS & SUSAN NASH, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 47 
(3rd ed. 2007). 
 209. See BROWNLIE, supra note 98, at 6–12. 
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of treaties and obligations of one State vis-à-vis another but 
does not directly create obligations of investors. On the other 
hand, general principles of law are helpful for determining 
obligations of non-State actors such as investors as discussed 
below.  
d. General Principles of Law  
General principles of law have played a prominent role in 
arbitrations between States and foreign nationals,210 as the 
jurisprudence of the IUSCT and ICSID cases demonstrates. 
General principles of law can come from comparative municipal 
law, the lex mercatoria, and public international law.211
Choosing domestic law as applicable does not make general 
principles of law irrelevant. The sole arbitrator in a non-ICSID 
investor-state dispute in Texaco v. Libya explained the 
relevance of general principles of law when domestic Libyan 
law was chosen as applicable. The arbitrator provided that:  
 
[T]he application of the principles of Libyan [domestic] law 
does not have the effect of ruling out the application of the 
principles of international law, but quite the contrary: it 
simply requires us to combine the two in verifying the 
conformity of the first with the second.212
The arbitrator relied both on the principle of the binding 
force of contracts recognized by Libyan law and on the principle 
pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept), which is 
essential to international law.
 
213
The United Nations Charter recognizes the importance of 
the principle of good faith.
  
214 This principle comes into play in 
the context of the exercise of rights by States215
 
 210.  Richard B. Lillich, The Law Governing Disputes under Economic 
Development Agreements: Reexamining the Concept of “Internalization,” in 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS 
“JUDICIALIZATION” AND UNIFORMITY? 61, 107–10 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles 
N. Brower eds., 1993); K. Lipstein, International Arbitration Between 
Individuals and Governments and the Conflict of Laws, in CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GEORGE 
SCHWARZENBERGER ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 177 (Bin Cheng & E. D. 
Brown eds., 1988). 
 and is otherwise 
 211. Grant Hanessian, “General Principles of Law” in the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 309, 318 (1988). 
 212. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./Cal. Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of 
the Libyan Arab Republic, Award, ¶ 49 (Jan. 19, 1977), 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).  
 213. See id. ¶ 51.  
 214. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2.  
 215. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 121 (George W. Keeton & Georg 
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described as the prohibition of malicious injury, that is, the 
exercise of a right—or supposed right—for the sole purpose of 
causing injury to another.216
The principle of good faith establishes interdependence 
between the rights of an investor and its obligations. A bona 
fide exercise of a right is expected rather than an exercise 
aimed at procuring an unfair advantage.
  
217 The exercise of a 
right in a manner which prejudices the interests of the other 
party (the State) would constitute a breach of the principle.218
International arbitration tribunals have developed 
increasingly specialized general principles of law in their case 
law.
 
219 The general principle of good faith gives rise to more 
specific obligations such as good faith in the conclusion, 
interpretation, and performance of contracts.220 An even more 
specific principle would be interpretation against a party that 
unilaterally drafted a contract.221
Other examples of general principles of law applied by 
investor-state tribunals include restitutio in integrum
  
222 and an 
injured person’s duty to mitigate damages.223 Tribunals have 
also applied principles of pacta sunt servanda,224 estoppel,225
 
Schwarzenberger eds., 1953). For an application of the principle in an ICSID 
context, see Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶¶ 230–39 (Aug. 2, 2006), 
http://italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf. 
 
 216. See CHENG, supra note 215, at 122. For an application of this principle 
in an investor-state context, see Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Recommendation on Provisional Measures, ¶¶ 154–58 (Mar. 21, 2007), 22 
ICSID Rev. 100 (2007). See also Waguih Elie George Siag v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 213 (Apr. 11, 
2007), http://italaw.com/documents/Siagv.Egypt.pdf. 
 217.  See CHENG, supra note 215, at 125. 
 218.  Id.  
 219.  See EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 54 (2010). 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./Cal. Asiatic Oil Co. v. 
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award, ¶¶ 97–109 (Jan. 19, 1977), 
17 I.L.M. 1 (1978); see also Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Award, ¶ 268 (Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID Rep. 413 
(1993). 
 223.  See Middle E. Cement Shipping and Handling Co. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award, ¶ 167 (Apr. 12, 2002), 7 ICSID Rep. 
173 (2005).  
 224.  See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co., 17 I.L.M. ¶ 51. 
 225.  See S. Pac. Props. (Middle E.) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/84/3, Award, ¶ 247 (May 20, 1992), 3 ICSID Rep. 102 (1995); see 
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nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans (prohibition 
from benefiting from one’s own fraud),226 exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus (person who is being sued for non-performance of 
contractual obligations can defend themselves by proving that 
the plaintiff did not perform their side of the bargain),227 unjust 
enrichment,228 and general principles of contract law.229
Unlike international treaties or international customary 
law, general principles of law can provide for obligations of 
private parties. In the absence of specific provisions setting out 
obligations of investors in international treaties, these 
principles of law serve as an appropriate source of law to 
determine obligations of investors in investor-state arbitration.  
  
e. Jurisprudence and Scholarly Writings  
While some general principles of law and legal rules are 
codified and easy to access,230 other principles are more difficult 
to identify.231 In practice, tribunals often skip the process of 
finding the “general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations” mentioned in Article 28 of the ICJ Statute because it 
is difficult and time-consuming. Instead, tribunals tend to rely 
on relevant international jurisprudence.232
International law does not operate on the basis of stare 
decisis or prior ICSID awards. Even prior ICSID awards 
applying similar investment treaty language do not constitute 
   
 
also Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Republic of Cameroon, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/81/2, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 123 (May 3, 1985), 2 ICSID Rep. 3 
(1994). 
 226.  See Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶¶ 240–44 (Aug. 2, 2006), 
http://italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf. 
 227.  See Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Republic of Cameroon, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, Award, 61–72 (Oct. 21, 1983), 2 ICSID Rep. 3 
(1994); Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela CA v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, Award, ¶ 316, (Sept. 23, 2003), 10 
ICSID Rep. 309 (2006). 
 228.  See Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/81/1, Resubmitted Case: Award, ¶¶ 154–56 (June 5, 1990), 1 ICSID Rep. 
569 (1993); S. Pac. Props. (Middle E.) Ltd., 3 ICSID Rep. ¶¶ 245–49; Inceysa 
Vallisoletana, S.L., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26 ¶¶ 253–57. 
 229.  See Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia, Award, ¶¶ 180–
83 (Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID Rep. 413 (1993). 
 230.  International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004 (International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Rome, 2004).  
 231. General principles of law often overlap with other sources of 
international law. See BROWNLIE, supra note 98, at 19. 
 232. See Fauchald, supra note 185, at 309–13. 
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binding precedent.233 Many investor-state tribunals, however, 
found themselves not barred, as a matter of principle, from 
considering the position taken or the opinion expressed by 
other tribunals.234
An ICSID tribunal in ADC v. Hungary emphasized, despite 
their non-binding nature, that  
   
cautious reliance on certain principles developed [in 
case law], as persuasive authority, may advance the 
body of law, which in turn may serve predictability in 
the interest of both investors and host States.
235
In addition to case law, investor-state tribunals often rely 
on scholarly writings to help establish norms of law.
  
236
Therefore, international jurisprudence and scholarly 
writings can be used as subsidiary means of identifying 
investor obligations in investor-state disputes.  
  
V. CONCLUSION  
The growing number of counterclaims submitted by States 
goes hand in hand with the growing number of investor-state 
disputes. The 2010 revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, which broadened jurisdiction of UNCITRAL tribunals, 
will further increase the number of State counterclaims. 
Correct understanding of the mechanism of investor consent to 
counterclaims and correct identification of investor obligations 
will make the system of investor-state dispute resolution more 
efficient and fair.  
Investor consent to counterclaims is essential. The relevant 
treaty dispute resolution clause affects jurisdiction of investor-
state tribunals. If the treaty contains an offer of jurisdiction 
only in relation to disputes arising out of State obligations, it 
may be difficult for the tribunal to extend its jurisdiction over 
counterclaims unless the parties subsequently alter this offer 
by an explicit or implicit agreement.  
Identification of investor obligations is crucial to 
 
 233.  See AES Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 27–28 (Apr. 26, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 308 (2007) 
(noting that although the tribunal may choose to follow positions taken by 
other tribunals, it is not required to do so). 
 234.  Id.  
 235.  ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/16, Award, ¶ 293 (Oct. 2, 2006), 15 ICSID Rep. 534 (2010).  
 236.  For a survey of sources relied upon by investor-state tribunals, see 
Jeffrey Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation 
Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 129 (2007). 
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determining the substantive content of the procedural right to 
counterclaim. Although investment treaties usually do not 
provide for investor obligations, such obligations can be found 
in other sources of law.  
Counterclaims cannot be based on domestic law obligations 
of investors unless such obligations were specifically mentioned 
in the relevant investment treaty or otherwise violate the 
parties’ preexisting international law commitments. Otherwise, 
violation of purely domestic law obligations is insufficient for 
an investor-state tribunal to extend its jurisdiction over 
counterclaims. 
In the absence of concrete provisions setting out investor 
obligations in international treaties, general principles of law 
appear to be an appropriate source of international law to 
determine such obligations.  
Contractual obligations of investors fall outside of the 
jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals with one exception. The 
State may assert counterclaims if the investor breached its 
obligations under the investment contract concluded with the 
State provided that the relevant investment treaty or an 
arbitration agreement contains a sufficiently broad dispute 
resolution clause. 
 
